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Abstract 
The rational expectations equilibrium has been criticized as an equilibrium concept in market 
game environments. Such an equilibrium may not exist generically, or it may introduce 
unrealistic assumptions about an economic agent's knowledge or computational ability. We 
define a rational expectations equilibrium as a probability measure over uncertain states of 
nature which exploits all available information in a market game, and which exists for almost 
all economies. Furthermore, if retrading is allowed, it is possible for agents to compute such 
a 'functional rational expectations equilibrium' using straightforward numerical fixed point 
algorithms. 
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1 Introduction
The application of the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) concept to market games
has not been unambiguously supported by researchers seeking to better understand, and
even define, an appropriate equilibrium selection criterion. Indeed, Dubey, Geanakoplos,
and Shubik [1987] criticize the concept of REE in market games (and more generally, in a
continuous, anonymous price formation mechanism). They focus instead upon equilibrium
selection according to the Nash equilibria (NE) of the market game. While NE are
available as solutions either generically (for a continuum of agents), or for an open set (for
a finite number of agents), REE cannot be implemented by price formation mechanisms
which generate these NE. Conversely, mechanisms which do admit REE (for example,
if traders submit their entire demand function to an auctioneer) are argued to be too
computationally complex to be realistic.
In addition, there is some evidence that NE alone may generate more realistic time
series properties of observed prices. Jackson and Peck [1999] examine an asymmetric
information, 2 period market game with an asset and a single consumption good. With
an infinite number of agents and no noise traders, they demonstrate that information is
not fully revealed in a (Bayesian) NE–instead, asset prices demonstrate excess volatility
relative to the dividend process of the asset. By contrast, REE cannot be obtained by
the price formation process.
The difficulties with using the REE concept in market games, as in the examples above,
usually hinge upon three main criticisms. First, the definition of an REE is circular: the
information content of prices is itself used to determine those prices. Second, as initially
examined by Grossman and Stiglitz [1980] and subsequently by many others, REE may
fail to exist when all agents are fully informed. In the absence of ‘noise’ or ‘liquidity’
traders, markets do not open. Finally, REE may be very difficult to find: if there is any
weight to the notion of bounded rationality, it is likely that normal, ‘real-world’ economic
participants will be unable to calculate any REE which might exist.
In this paper we extend the definition of an REE from the usual point representation
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to one of a ‘functional REE’, in a simple market game environment. Starting from a
similar model as Jackson and Peck [1999], but with a finite number of agents, a func-
tional relation is defined between the expectations of the agents (here, defined by prior
probability measures) and the ‘result’ of the economy, which is also given by a probability
measure. When expectations match the result of the economy, i.e. when the relation
possesses a functional fixed point, the economy is said to possesses a functional REE:
individual agent expectations about the economy’s law of motion are fulfilled, and all
available information is being used.
In addition, if retrading of assets is allowed, then this functional REE can be learned–
it is possible for agents to sample the functional relation by submitting many different
priors, and observing the outcome. It is shown how to design an algorithm which can
estimate the functional relation itself, and then find the REE probability measure by
applying standard numerical fixed point algorithms.
Section 2 introduces the market game environment, while Section 3 introduces the
functional REE as an equilibrium probability measure. Section 4 then demonstrates the
existence of an REE probability measure, and Section 5 shows one possible method for
numerically estimating such an REE. The final section concludes.
2 The Market Game
We consider a static game environment without retrading as in Jackson and Peck [1999]
(retrading will be examined in Section 5). There exist I <∞ agents who trade in a single
consumption good, single asset economy. Each agent i possesses a preference relation
over the consumption good, which is assumed to be representable by an individual utility
function ui. The utility function is further assumed to be continuous, strictly increasing
and concave.
Each agent i also possesses an endowment ei of the consumption good and the asset,
defined as
ei := (b¯, q¯), 0 < b¯, q¯ <∞.
2
The asset pays a stochastic dividend d in the single good, drawn from a finite set
of M possible dividends D := {d1, . . . , dM}. Each agent i receives a random signal si
about the value of the dividend, drawn from a finite set of N signals S := {s1, . . . , sN}.
Each signal si is drawn from S according to an independently and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) process P(s|d) : S × D → [0, 1], which is the probability of observing a private
signal s conditional upon the dividend draw d ∈ D. It is assumed that this distribution is
common knowledge among all agents. The vector of all private signals drawn by the agents
is denoted s := (s1, . . . , sI). Occasionally, d is used to denote a ‘generic’ or representative
member of D, or will be used as an argument to emphasize a functional dependence (viz.
the prior probability measure pii(d) defined below).
The consumption good and the asset are traded at a series of ‘trading posts’, which
accept offers of the consumption good in return for the asset. These offers are denoted
‘bids’ bi of an agent i for the asset. In addition, a trading post will also accept offers of the
asset in return for the consumption good. For each agent i these offers are denoted ‘asks’
qi. We let b = (b1, . . . , bI) represent the vector of bids, and q = (q1, . . . , qI) represent the
vector of asks.
2.1 The Agent’s Problem
Each agent i seeks to maximize their expected utility of consumption, conditional upon
their private signal:
max
{bi,qi}
E[ui(ci)|si], (2.1)
where feasible bids and asks obey bi ∈ [0, b¯], qi ∈ [0, q¯]. Final consumption ci depends
upon both the realization of the dividend and the market clearing price (see below).
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2.1.1 Expectations Formation
Agents are endowed with a set of priors over D, denoted pii : D → [0, 1]. It is assumed
that these priors are non-zero everywhere, and
M∑
j=1
pii(d
j) = 1.
Since the conditional distribution of the signal si given any dividend value d ∈ D is known,
after observing the signal an agent updates their prior using Bayes’ Rule:
pii(d|si) = pi(si|d)pii(d)
pii(si)
, (2.2)
where
pii(s) :=
M∑
j=1
pi(s|dj)pii(dj) (2.3)
is agent i’s unconditional probability measure over the signal space S.
Using the posterior distribution pii(d|si), the agent’s problem (2.1) may also be written
as
max
{bi,qi}
M∑
j=1
ui(ci(d
j))pii(d
j|si). (2.4)
2.2 Market Clearing and Price Formation
The market environment is a market game–agents are assumed to trade at the trading
post in order to achieve their desired bundles. They submit bids and asks to the trading
post, which calculates the ratio of bids to asks and set this as the market clearing price:
p =
∑I
i=1 bi∑I
i=1 qi
=
B
Q
, (2.5)
where B =
∑I
i=1 bi is the aggregate bid, and Q =
∑I
i=1 qi is the aggregate ask. Note that
if B or Q is equal to 0 then p = 0.
4
After submitting their bids and asks each agent i receives a share of the consumption
good equal to:
ci = b¯− bi + dˆ
(
bi
p
+ q¯ − qi
)
+ pqi, (2.6)
where the right hand side denotes (in turn) the net consumption good trade b¯−bi, the pro-
ceeds from the asset trading once the dividend value dˆ has been realized, dˆ
(
bi
p
+ q¯ − qi
)
,
and finally the payoff from assets held, pqi.
2.3 Optimal Bids and Asks
We proceed under the assumption that the individual consumers are intelligent enough
to understand what their bids and asks will depend upon, but do not have enough infor-
mation to completely specify this dependence.
From the consumer’s optimization problem, we have the following first order condi-
tions:
E
[
∂ui
∂ci
(
d
p
− 1 + bi
(
− d
p2
∂p
∂bi
))]
= 0, (2.7)
E
[
∂ui
∂ci
(
p− d+ qi ∂p
∂qi
)]
= 0, (2.8)
which may be simplified using the fact that p = B/Q to
E
[
∂ui
∂ci
(
d
p
− 1 + bi
(
− d
p2
1
Q
))]
= 0, (2.9)
E
[
∂ui
∂ci
(
p− d− qi p
Q
)]
= 0. (2.10)
Solving these implicit equations for (bi, qi) yields the dependence of the individual’s
optimal strategy of bids and asks upon the posterior distribution pii(d|si) and the price
level p:
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b∗i = bi(pii(d|si), p), q∗i = qi(pii(d|si), p).
Using the fact that the price level will be determined from the bids and asks of all other
agents, we can specify the ex ante dependence that the bid and ask functions will have
upon other agents:
b∗i = bi(pi(d|s)), q∗i = qi(pi(d|s)),
where for simplicity of exposition we have defined
pi(d|s) := (pi1(d|s1), . . . , piI(d|sI)) (2.11)
to be the vector of posterior probabilities over the dividend held by all consumers, con-
ditional upon the vector of signals s received. Note that as both D and S are finite sets,
pi(d|s) is a list of I ×M ×N values.
For all but the entries corresponding to their own conditional probabilities and signal,
the posterior probabilities pi(d|s) are unknown to each agent. Since the market game
stipulates that each consumer submit one bid and ask, to close the model consumers
must have some way of resolving this uncertainty about others’ expectations and signals.
3 The Functional REE Concept
The information usable to each agent is summarized in the signal si, in the signal’s
conditional distribution pi(si|d), and in the prior probability distribution pii(d). As it is
assumed that each agent may have a different prior distribution, there is no ‘collapse’ of
the economy whereby prices are fully revealing and individuals either refuse to trade or
are indifferent to trade (see e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz [1980]). Rather, the price will in
general not be fully revealing (see Jackson and Peck [1999]), but will realistically reveal
something about the underlying distribution of dividends prior to the actual dividend
realization dˆ being announced.
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In fact, this revelation is sufficient to define a rational expectations in the following
way. Rather than focus solely upon the price outcome as being ‘fully revealing’ or not
(which is unrealistic), an agent can have an ex ante probability measure pi(d) over the
dividend space D which turns out to be the ‘correct’ measure, according to all information
available to the agent. That is, after submitting bids and asks and observing the market
equilibrium price, the posterior probability over the dividend state after incorporating
the equilibrium price as new information is the same as the prior distribution which was
used when trades were submitted to the market. We call such a situation a ‘(functional)
rational expectations equilibrium’ (REE), where the term ‘functional’ is indicative of the
fact that the equilibrium is actually defined as a measure over all dividend states–here
such a ‘function’ is merely a set of numbers as D is discrete, but this may certainly be
generalized if D is continuous.
It is important that this equilibrium definition be consistent, i.e. that it be possible for
agents to construct their bids and asks in a logical, or even ‘optimal’ fashion, according to
their expectations. To this end, let us first define the available information that the agent
may use after the market has cleared, and back out from this the optimal expectations
which are to be used in the optimal bid and ask selection process.
Definition 1. A temporary equilibrium under heterogeneous priors is a price p∗ given by
p∗ := p(pi(d|s)), (3.1)
where pi(d|s) is as given in (2.11).
The appellation ‘temporary equilibrium’, which is used in dynamic models of learning and
convergence to REE, is actually more appropriate for Section 5 when retrading is allowed.
Here, of course, the model is static, so there is nothing ‘temporary’ about the equilibrium
price p∗. But we introduce the term here because the REE concept really only has power
in a dynamic environment where agents can potentially learn it–as the saying goes, an
REE is the equilibrium which is learned when all systematic learning errors have been
eliminated. This can only take place in a dynamic environment.
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We can now begin to add structure to the definition of an REE. If the equilibrium is
to contain all available information, and furthermore if it is to avoid systematic errors,
then the prior probability measure over the dividend which agents infer ex ante from
the economic system as a whole must equal the probability measure which the economic
system signals through the temporary equilibrium price. In other words, an REE is
precisely that prior probability measure pi∗(d) which ensures that when pii = pi∗∀i, all
agents are in fact observing this probability ex post, i.e. after updating their priors upon
observing the price level p∗. Note that this probability measure need not equal the actual
probability distribution over the dividend process pi(d). In fact, it is inconsistent to restrict
the REE measure to the actual prior probability measure pi(d)–there may be many REE,
depending upon how many prior probability measures are supported by the temporary
equilibrium price p∗.
Thus, an REE probability measure is a measure pi∗(d) which obtains if all agents 1)
use pi∗(d) as their prior measure for d ∈ D, 2) observe their private signal si and use
Bayes’ Rule to update this prior to pii(d|si; pi∗), 3) submit optimal bids and asks, and 4)
condition upon the resulting temporary equilibrium price to perform Bayes’ Rule once
more, such that
pii(d|p∗, si; pi∗i ) = pi∗(d) ∀i,∀d ∈ D.
4 Existence of an REE
The main result of the paper is that the set of REE probability measures pi∗(d) may be
shown to exist, and may be found using relatively straightforward (but complex) compu-
tational techniques. We first show that there exists a set of REE probability measures
for every ‘well-behaved’ market game without the common prior, common knowledge as-
sumption. Second, using arguments developed for functional REE in Kelly and Shorish
[2000], we demonstrate how to find these REE probability measures using the temporary
equilibria and private signal data available to each agent.
To establish existence of an REE probability measure we return once more to the
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optimal bid and ask functions for a consumer i from Section 2.3:
b∗i = bi(pi(d|s)), q∗i = qi(pi(d|s)).
We first consider the optimal bid function (treatment of the optimal ask function
proceeds in the same fashion). The optimal bid function may be viewed as a function of
the set of all possible signals received by all other agents, the set of all possible conditional
probability measures, and the respective measures imposed upon these two sets.
Every agent i can form the probability that another agent (say agent j) observes a
signal sj, conditional upon observing their own signal si–this is because signals are iid
draws with conditional distribution pi(si|d) ∀i, and all agents know this:
pii(sj|si) :=
M∑
k=1
pi(sj|dk)pii(dk|si). (4.1)
This probability measure defines the uncertainty a consumer has about the signals
received by other agents. On the other hand, there also exists uncertainty about the
conditional probability pij(d|sj) held by agent j, which also forms part of the optimal bid
function b∗i .
Definition 2. The conditional probability held by agent i about agent j’s unconditional
probability distribution over the dividend space D is 1
ipij(d) :=
N∑
k=1
pij(d|sk)pii(sk|si) ∀d ∈ D. (4.2)
Armed with this definition we can start to form agent i’s expectations about agent j’s
conditional probability over the dividend space. First, using Bayes’ Rule once more we
can rewrite pij(d|sk) in the above definition:
pij(d|sk) = pi(s
k|d)pij(d)∑M
m=1 pi(s
k|dm)pij(dm)
. (4.3)
1Note the superscripts here–the summation in (4.2) is performed over all possible signals that agent j
could have obtained, weighted by agent i’s conditional probability that agent j has received that signal.
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We next make the following observations. Although agent i does not know the prior
probability distribution pij(d) used by agent j, there is a best guess of this distribution
given by ipij(d) in (4.2). Hence, we can set pij(d) =
ipij(d) in (4.3). In addition, agent i
wishes to solve out for pij(d|sk) in (4.2) and (4.3), i.e the agent wishes to find a number
ipij(d|sk) such that ∀k,
ipij(d|sk) =
pi(sk|d)
(∑N
n=1
ipij(d|sn)pii(sn|si)
)
∑M
m=1 pi(s
k|dm)
(∑N
n=1
ipij(dm|sn)pii(sn|si)
) , ∀k = 1 . . . N,∀d ∈ D. (4.4)
This is a set of M ×N equations in ipij(d|sk), which are (for each agent i and j) simply
a set of M × N unknowns. Since these equations are analytic in the unknowns, there
exists a solution ipi∗j to (4.4). This solution is completely expressible in terms of the
prior probability pii(d) held by agent i, and the commonly known conditional probability
pi(si|d), through both ipij(d) and pii(s|si).
From the above analysis we see that an agent can form consistent expectations about
other agents’ conditional probability distributions pij(d|sj), using only the publicly avail-
able information pi(s|d) and the prior probability pii(d). This allows the agent to submit
an optimal bid (or ask) by forming the proper conditional expectations given in the con-
sumer’s problem of Section 2.
After the bids and asks have been submitted, the market clears and the temporary
equilibrium price p∗ is found. This price depends both upon the prior probability measures
pii(d) of all agents in the economy, and also upon all signals si received by agents and
conditioned upon when trades were submitted. In what follows, we shall suppress the
dependence of p∗ upon the prior measures and concentrate upon the signals, and let
p∗ = p(s) denote the temporary equilibrium price as a function of the vector of signals s.
Each agent now uses the temporary equilibrium price to update their probability
measure pii(d|si), again using Bayes’ Rule:
pii(d|p∗, si) = pii(p
∗|d, si)pii(d, si)∑M
k=1 pii(p
∗|dk, si)pii(dk, si)
. (4.5)
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It is straightforward to show that for a temporary equilibrium price p∗,
pii(p
∗ = p(s)|d, si) =
∑
s∈p−1(p∗)
I∏
j=1
pi(sj|d), (4.6)
where the summation is over all signal vectors s ∈ S which are compatible with the
observed temporary equilibrium price p∗.
In addition, we also know that
pii(d, si) = pi(si|d)pii(d). (4.7)
Substitution of (4.6) and (4.7) into (4.5) yields a posterior distribution over the divi-
dend space which is once more completely specified by pi(si|d) and pii(d).
Definition 3. A rational expectations equilibrium (REE) probability measure is a measure
pi∗(d) such that for every agent i = 1 . . . I,
pii(d) = pi
∗(d),
pii(d|p∗, si; pi∗(d)) = pi∗(d),
where we have emphasized the dependence of the posterior probability measure pii(d|p∗, si)
on the prior probability measure pi∗(d).
The existence of an REE probability measure is relatively easy to verify.
Theorem 4.1. For almost every economy, there exists a rational expectations equilibrium
probability measure (pi1, . . . , piI) = (pi
∗, . . . , pi∗) which is a fixed point of the mapping
T ◦ (pi1, . . . , piI) := (pi1(d|p(s), s1; pi1), . . . , piI(d|p(s), sI ; piI)). (4.8)
The proof involves a straightforward application of the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz
lemma–see Border [1985], Corollary 5.7 p. 27. The only restrictions are 1) that for each
prior probability measure pii(d), the set of posterior distributions be sufficiently rich to
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encompass any convex combination of prior probability measures for any subset of agents,
and 2) that there exists at least one possible prior probability measure pˆi(d) and at least
one agent i so that the set of possible posteriors pii(d|p(s), si; pˆi(d)) is compact. Because
the conditional expectations for the optimal bids and asks and the Bayesian updating of
the distributions involve analytic functions, their power series representations are nearly
always convergent and hence well-defined–the only possible problems occur when the nor-
malization of the Bayesian updating fails, i.e. when the prior places zero weight on a
possible dividend value, or when either bids or asks approach the lower boundary of the
endowment set for all agents (in which case there is no informative price as p∗ = 0).
5 Retrading and Functional REE
Having found that functional REE exist, i.e. that there almost always exist probability
measures which incorporate all available information and support prior expectations of
all agents, it remains to be shown that such equilibria can actually be learned. In order to
do so, we open the market up to retrading, so that agents live in a dynamic environment
which allows them to learn the mapping between their prior probability measure, and the
temporary equilibrium posterior measure.
Retrading means that agents can resubmit bids and asks to the market after each trade
has been completed. Once retrading is allowed, stationary equilibrium concepts have to
be adjusted. For example, Dubey [1980] has shown that the NE from finite player market
games are generically inefficient when retrading is allowed. This result was extended by
Dubey and Rogowski [1990], showing that NE efficiency only occurs if and only if initial
agent endowments are themselves efficient. Finally, if a continuum of agents is allowed,
Dubey, Sahi, and Shubik [1993] show that the NE regains its preeminence under retrading
prior to final consumption–in this case, NE are both efficient and Walrasian.
Although economies with a finite number of agents are inefficient, retrading does allow
agents to improve the efficiency of their individual outcomes—Ghosal and Morelli [2004]
show that agents have an incentive with retrading to recontract from the NE, in order to
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move closer to the Pareto-frontier. After a finite number of periods the Pareto-frontier
may not be reached, but any Pareto-efficient outcome may be approximated arbitrarily
closely if the number of retrading periods is ‘large enough’.
At this stage cannot explicitly address these efficiency issues in what follows–rather,
we consider the retrading environment as a ‘test ground’ for an agent to attempt to learn
the mapping which takes their prior probability measure as an input, and returns (via the
temporary equilibrium price) a posterior measure. The question of how convergence to
(or toward) the Pareto frontier may be obtained under the learning paradigm introduced
below is an interesting topic of future research.
We consider once more a finite agent market game, but now with a (finite or infinite)
number of retrading periods t = 1, 2, . . .. For agents to attempt to learn the REE, which
is a collection of functions representing the probability measure over the dividend space
D, we consider the following strategy adapted from Kelly and Shorish [2000]:
1. Agent i begins period t with a ‘prior’ probability measure piit. If this is the first
trading period then pii1 = pii(d|si), i.e. the updated prior probability measure pii(d)
after the signal si is observed.
2. At each trading point t, agent i submits optimal bid and ask strategies as in Section
2, conditional upon the prior piit.
3. Agents i observes the temporary equilibrium price p∗ and uses it to update the prior
as in Section 4, leading to the outcome T ◦ piit = piTit := pii(d|p∗, si; piit(d)).
4. Agent i sets a new prior for period t + 1: this may be accomplished with either a
randomly selected probability measure, or else by setting piit+1 = pi
T
it .
5. After τ periods, the agent estimates the operator T using the data set (piit, pi
T
it)t=1...τ .
6. Finally, standard numerical methods allow agents to find the fixed point of the
operator T–this is the (functional) REE of the economy, pi∗.
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Agents thus use retrading as a way to sample the space of possible posterior distributions,
conditional upon the prior distributions they have submitted.
The main question to be answered is whether or not it is possible for agents to actually
implement this algorithm in practice. There are two requirements to ensure that this
algorithm is actually feasible:
Assumption 5.1. For all piit bounded (e.g. in the sup norm), pi
T
it is also bounded–that
is, the operator T sends bounded functions to bounded functions.
Assumption 5.2. Both piit and pi
T
it are Borel-measurable, that is, they possess at most a
finite number of discontinuities.
Assumption (5.1) simply states that the probability measures are well-defined. Note
that in a continuous space of dividends this excludes using a Dirac-type of distribution,
which is not implementable as a computable function except as a limit of integrable
functions (which are in fact bounded). Here, though, the discreteness of D ensures that
this assumption is automatically verified. Assumption (5.2) is also satisfied by probability
measures, as there are a finite number of dividends by assumption.
With these two assumptions in hand it is possible to implement the above algorithm,
with the assistance of a class of functions which can serve as a ‘basis’ for the probability
measures of interest. In Kelly and Shorish [2000], we explain in great detail how to
accomplish this implementation, for a general class of functional REE. Briefly, the class
of basis functions, known as ‘universal approximators’, allows an agent to use histogram
data from the operator T to estimate the posterior probability measure piTit , for a given
prior probability measure piit, by fitting a parametric family of curves to the histogram.
By varying the prior probability measure used to compute bids and asks for the tem-
porary equilibrium (which is also expressed using the basis functions), an entire map of
(piit, pi
T
it) pairs can be generated over the retrading sample t = 1 . . . τ . Using the same
class of universal approximators, it is possible to find the mapping which turns the prior
probability vector into the temporary equilibrium, posterior probability vector. This is a
representation of the functional operator T (call it Tˆ ).
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Lastly, an agent can use a numerical fixed point algorithm of choice to compute the
fixed point (as a vector) of the representation Tˆ . Using this vector fixed point, it is then
possible to construct the functional fixed point pi∗.
Notice that the agent’s optimal decision-making is part of what builds the functional
fixed point to be estimated–in particular, the bids and asks must be rationally generated
from Bayes’ Rule. But the strategy used may be generated from other optimizing criteria,
or from strategic concerns (e.g. a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium; see Ghosal and Morelli
[2004]).
In addition, it is important to note that along the equilibrium path, while the func-
tional data set is generated, there is no point where trade ceases to exist. This is because
the agent needs to sample ‘enough’ points in the function space to get a good fit for the
functional mapping, and this will require submitting a (usually random) distribution of
prior probability measures. So the prior probabilities may not even be rationally chosen–
only the bids and asks, and the updating of the prior probability after the temporary
equilibrium price is revealed, need be rationally generated. This is the content of step 4
above.
Of course, sampling this probability space is both computationally expensive and also
expensive in terms of forgone gains to trade–the prior probability measures are not se-
lected with any optimality criteria until the functional fixed point of T is found. Therefore,
it may make sense for the agent to exploit the properties of the mapping T which may
speed convergence–if, for example, the mapping has properties which are consistent with
a contraction mapping, then it may make sense for the previously obtained posterior dis-
tribution piTit to become next period’s prior piit+1. This argument is also strengthened due
to the way Bayes’ Rule functions–the ‘narrowing in on the truth’ toward the true dividend
distribution pi(d) is facilitated by adopting the previous period’s posterior distribution as
the following period’s prior, and so convergence to the true dividend distribution (should
it be an REE!) may obtain under learning.
15
6 Conclusion
For market games with a finite number of players and a finite number of uncertain states,
there is in general a rational expectations equilibrium (REE) which is defined as a prob-
ability measure over the states. Moreover, this REE may be found using a numerical
algorithm, which has the advantage of being stated in terms of computable components
(like Fourier coefficients). This allows agents to harness the enormous computing power
of the early 21st century to maximum advantage. Although it is an open question as to
whether or not an REE is a desirable equilibrium concept, the notion that ‘expectations
are fulfilled using all available information’ remains a compelling argument. In this envi-
ronment, far from obtaining a no-trade REE, ‘most’ economies have a lively exchange of
goods and assets as agents seek to both do the right thing (via optimization) and learn
as much as possible on the way toward finding the REE, a which point learning ceases.
It would be very interesting implement a market game in a computational environment,
to demonstrate the algorithm in a similar way as in Kelly and Shorish [2000], and this
is one topic of future research. For a continuum of agents, Shubik and Vriend [1999]
have shown that with piecewise linear utility functions a simulated economy using genetic
algorithms and classifier systems can numerically converge to stationary NE of market
games. Designing a simulation with many agents estimating a functional REE would
expand the applicability of simulation techniques to this finite agent environment.
Lastly, it is an open question as to whether or not it is ‘worth it’ to know the truth, i.e.
to find an REE for any market where trading takes place over many periods. The success of
‘rule of thumb’ strategies implies that, on some level, higher welfare gains are achieved by
using strategies which are not too complex. It may be that the REE computing algorithm
designed here carries a higher welfare cost than an alternative algorithm which does
not seek to find any equilibrium (e.g., a completely myopic, one-period-ahead strategy).
Finding a good measure of the welfare costs of algorithms, and the associated efficiency
of the REE itself, is another further direction of research.
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